Institutional and Socioeconomic Determinants of Farmers' Contribution to Irrigation-System Maintenance: Evidence from Concrete-Lined and Unlined Watercourses in Punjab, Pakistan
Farmer Contributions to Irrigation Maintenance
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66529/agripat.2026.2.4.130Keywords:
collective action;, irrigation maintenance;, binary logistic regression;, common-pool resources;, Punjab;, Pakistan;, watercourse managementAbstract
Sustainable irrigation infrastructure requires collective farmer contributions to maintenance, yet evidence on whether watercourse infrastructure type influences such contributions remains limited in Pakistan. This study compares farmer contributions across concrete-lined and unlined watercourses in Nankana Sahib, Punjab, and identifies their socioeconomic and institutional determinants. Primary data were collected from 100 farming households, including 25 using concrete-lined and 75 using unlined watercourses. Overall, 58% of respondents contributed labour, cash, or in-kind resources to maintenance during the preceding 12 months. A binary logistic regression examined associations with income, education, farm size, ownership, tube-well dependence, watercourse type, and community trust. Trust (OR = 1.72, 95% CI: 1.19–2.48, p = 0.004) and household income (OR = 1.02 per thousand PKR, 95% CI: 1.01–1.04, p = 0.014) were positively associated with maintenance contribution, while tube-well dependence showed a negative association (OR = 0.96, 95% CI: 0.94–0.99, p = 0.016). Education, farm size, ownership, and watercourse type were insignificant. The model was significant (χ² = 37.42, p < 0.001; Nagelkerke R² = 0.437; AUC = 0.81). Findings highlight trust and income as important predictors, while the unequal infrastructure subsamples limit conclusions regarding channel type. Results support trust-building and livelihood-strengthening interventions locally in comparable rural irrigation settings.
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